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This highlights an area in which Khrushchev’s foreign policy was not particularly successful. By alienating China he split the communist international movement and demonstrated how the ‘Soviet Union’s relationship to the world was rich in paradoxes’;[20] Khrushchev maintained a socialist state but still valued relations with capitalist economies. However, his relations with these were not consistent either.

   Brezhnev’s collective leadership came to power on ‘a wave of sobering disappointments’ with Khrushchev’s ostentatious experiments.[21] Brezhnev attempted to adopt a policy of dйtente and in the twenty years he was in office he achieved highlights such as the nuclear treaties of 1969, the SALT talks in the early seventies and the 1975 Helsinki Accord, along with some predicaments such as the 1968 Prague Spring, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Polish Risings of 1980.

   Brezhnev concentrated on arming the Soviet Union, rather than bluffing about arms as Khrushchev has been accused of. In this manner Brezhnev created a new dialogue with the US. He sought to expand international dйtente and linked this with economic dйtente, increasing Soviet economic independence by enlisting the resources of capitalist economies, a policy which proved successful as the Soviet wealth and technological abilities began to grow.[22]

   The Prague Spring was the first major event that Brezhnev tackled in leadership. Dubcek attempted to reform the Czechoslovakian Communist Party based around the slogan ‘socialism with a face’, making the party more open to democratisation. Brezhnev showed he tolerated this to an extent, but when he believed there was a real danger of the loss of Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev abandoned any attempt at a political solution and set about purging communist members and replacing the government.

   From the point of view of the maintenance of Soviet rule throughout Eastern Europe, this was a success for Brezhnev. His reasoning for the invasion were made clear in his renowned ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ in which he stated that the socialist commonwealth was duty bound to intervene where socialism was under threat in a member country.[23] However, Czechoslovakia remained resentful of the Soviet Union and this soured relations with the West, halting political reform in Eastern Europe and slowing economic reform at home. It also had the effect of demonstrating that when given the autonomy, communist parties could initiate reform and win public support.[24] Brezhnev’s view that this was an internal communist affair and should not disturb relations with the West was proved to be rather naive.

   Nevertheless, the US carried on with dйtente and managed to agree on a number of arms treaties. In 1968 the US, the UK and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and further discussions regarding arms control resulted in the SALT agreement of 1971. Brezhnev hoped to institutionalise these meetings with the Western powers and carry on with regular meetings which characterised dйtente. Throughout most of the late sixties to early seventies he was very successful at this, as Nogee asserts, ‘The number and variety of these agreements was unprecedented in Soviet diplomacy’.[25] The Moscow Summit of 1972 is another example at Brezhnev’s diplomatic success during this period of improving relations with the US, for him, this was a personal triumph. He believed that these relations were permanent, friendly and cooperative. There was an ‘extraordinary rapport’[26] between Nixon and Brezhnev. However, after the Watergate scandal Nixon’s domestic influences deteriorated which was reflected in subsequent summits and by 1974 the US had a new President, Ford, who was less committed to dйtente.

   The Helsinki Accord of 1975 was a success for Brezhnev in Europe, settled the post-war borders and regimes and laid the foundations for dйtente and status quo in Europe, Described by Suny as ‘the apogee of international dйtente’ it came at the last moments of worldwide dйtente.

   The invasion of Afghanistan was a success for Brezhnev in terms of retaining the communist rule in Eastern Europe; however, in relations to associations with the West it only served to confirm the opinion of anti-dйtente campaigners in the West that the Soviet Union was still only interested in the world expansion of communism. The decision to rescue Afghanistan by quashing the insurgents who disagreed with the new socialist government’s reform of traditional life in Czechoslovakia in 1979 outraged Islam and reinforced the ‘anti-hegemonist’ case from China. The US made the decision to withdraw from talks regarding SALT II and to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games. This, coupled with the already frosty relations between the US and the Soviet Union, served to worsen the USSR’s standing in dйtente.

   The timing of the invasion could not have been much worse for the USSR.[27] Brezhnev seemed to have ignored the wider consequences of his actions. However, in regards to internal socialist policy it was important for Brezhnev to retain his authority over the communist-bloc, assuming that this was not an issue which would affect relations with the West. This is a theme which was recurrent throughout the rule of both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and was one of the main reasons that dйtente was doomed to failure.

   The Polish risings of 1980-1 were the breaking point for dйtente with the West. The loss of Poland was deemed ‘completely unacceptable’[28] to the Soviet Union, despite the fact that an invasion would be catastrophic for Brezhnev’s diplomatic prospects. Reagan and Thatcher had already resisted dйtente and the Soviet actions in Poland only served to authenticate their rhetoric. Brezhnev and his leadership lost their legitimacy, and their rule ‘sank into terminal decline’.[29] It revealed to the world the underlying weakness of Soviet power in the East and the fragility of communist loyalty to the state outside the USSR.[30]

   Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev aimed to improve international relations whilst maintaining rule in the communist-bloc. This resulted on relations with both the West and the communist bloc becoming fractured beyond repair. However, they both were willing to offer to embark on a reduction of tensions with the West; such personal initiatives were unheard of from the Soviet leadership before Khrushchev. Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union was brought into world politics, challenging the US for paramountcy.[31] One of the reasons that ultimately both reigns were rather unsuccessful with international relations in the eyes of the West was due to the fact that both failed to recognise that domestic and foreign affairs were intertwined, a change to one led to a change on the other.

References
Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years, (Oxford, 1983)
R. Lowenthal, ‘The Soviet Union in the Post Revolutionary Era: An Overview’ in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 1-23
Vernon V. Aspaturian, ‘Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties’ in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 129-163
George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics, (London, 1982)
Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd Edition, (Harper-Collins, 1989)
Marie Mendras, ‘Policy outside and Politics Inside’, in Archie Brown (Ed.) Political Leadership in the Soviet Union, (London, 1989) p. 127-163
Robert V. Daniels, ‘Political Processes and Generational Change’ in Archie Brown (Ed.) Political Leadership in the Soviet Union, (London, 1989) p. 96-127
Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 3rd Edition, (Oxford, 1988)
Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999)
William Taubman, ‘Khrushchev and Dйtente: Reform in the International Context’ in Robert O. Crummey (Ed.), Reform in Russia and the USSR: Past and Prospects, (Illinois, 1989) p. 144-156
Alexander Yanov, ‘In the Grip of Adversarial Paradigm: The Case of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev in Retrospect’ in Robert O. Crummey (Ed.), Reform in Russia and the USSR: Past and Prospects, (Illinois, 1989) p. 156-182
Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 2nd Edition, (Longman, 1993)
Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998)
Jonathan Steele, The Limits of Soviet Power: The Kremlin’s Foreign Policy – Brezhnev to Chernenko, (New York, 1983)

________________________________________
[3] R. Lowenthal, ‘The Soviet Union in the Post Revolutionary Era: An Overview’ in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 1
[4] George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics, (London, 1982) p. 271
[5] Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999) p. 42
[6] Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999) p. 62
[7] Marie Mendras, ‘Policy outside and Politics Inside’, in Archie Brown (Ed.) Political Leadership in the Soviet Union, (London, 1989) p. 141
[8] Nikita Khrushchev in P. E. Mosley (Ed.) ‘The Soviet Union 1922-1962, A Foreign Affairs Reader’ cited in Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 3rd Edition, (Oxford, 1988) p. 30
[9] Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd Edition, (Harper-Collins, 1989) p. 118
[10] Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 411
[11] Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd Edition, (Harper-Collins, 1989) p. 337
[12] Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 413
[13] Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 414
[14] Alexander Yanov, ‘In the Grip of Adversarial Paradigm: The Case of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev in Retrospect’ in Robert O. Crummey (Ed.), Reform in Russia and the USSR: Past and Prospects, (Illinois, 1989) p. 177
[15] Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 417
[16] Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 3rd Edition, (Harper-Collins, 1989) p. 339
[17] Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 2nd Edition, (Longman, 1993) p. 270
[18] William Taubman, ‘Khrushchev and Dйtente: Reform in the International Context’ in Robert O. Crummey (Ed.), Reform in Russia and the USSR: Past and Prospects, (Illinois, 1989) p. 149
[19] Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 412
[20] Marie Mendras, ‘Policy outside and Politics Inside’, in Archie Brown (Ed.) Political Leadership in the Soviet Union, (London, 1989) p. 128
[21] R. Lowenthal, ‘The Soviet Union in the Post Revolutionary Era: An Overview’ in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 11
[22] George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics, (London, 1982) p. 207
[23] Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 2nd Edition, (Longman, 1993) p. 321
[24] Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 428
[25] Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 3rd Edition, (Oxford, 1988) p. 270
[26] Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 3rd Edition, (Oxford, 1988) p. 273
[27] Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years, (Oxford, 1983) p.
[28] Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991, (London, 1999) p. 83
[29] Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 2nd Edition, (Longman, 1993) p. 323
[30] Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, (Oxford, 1998) p. 446
[31] Vernon V. Aspaturian, ‘Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties’ in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Eds.), Soviet Foreign Politics since Khrushchev, (New Jersey, 1968) p. 134

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