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Discuss the issue of propaganda and censorship in the Gulf War

   Limited access to the theatre of actions was one of the main issues when revealing the news to the public. The major difficulty for the press in covering the war was actually getting to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia did not have any American reporters in the country when the invasion of Kuwait occurred. The Saudis were not eager to change the situation. The U.S. had to use persuasion to get the press in to cover the military.

Other examples of how Reporters were limited:
  • Turkish state television barred scenes of U.S. bombing raids originating in that country.
  • Saudi Arabia censored all foreign publications, and banned those with articles dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organization or Iraqi civilian bombing casualties.
  • Syria, detained writers and intellectuals for expressing support for Iraq.
  • France banned any pro-Iraqi publications and
  • In Iraq, CNN reporter Peter Arnett was heavily restricted in what he could write or show. He was not allowed to show or discuss any military damage nor was he permitted to talk freely to ordinary citizens without a government escort.
  • Reporters in the Gulf were routinely and openly censored and harassed by military public affairs officers. All pool reports had to be submitted to the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran, the official censoring location, for security review.
1.1.1 Censorship by Delay
One of the biggest complaints by the press corps during Desert Storm was the delays in getting pool reports back from the front. If everything worked right, the quickest a piece of video could make it back from the front was one day. Frequently it took three.
1.1.2 Censorship Through Misinformation
Some of the events covered up by the military included:
• The extent of casualties from "friendly fire";
• Use of Napalm bombs on Iraqi ground troops;
• Inaccuracy of U.S. bombs dropped on Iraq and occupied Kuwait;
• The "fuel-air bomb" experiment;
• U.S. battlefield casualties disguised as training accidents.

   The military deceived the press by serving up contradictory or confusing figures about battle damage, and about the destruction of Iraqi targets. The most significant deception was the impression that a Marine landing was planned when in fact it was a means to convince Iraq that it had to deploy troops to block an invasion from the sea.

   It was not until mid-1997 that the American people learned the truth about the performance of Gulf War weapons that were so highly praised during the conflict. A newly declassified report by the General Accounting Office, released in late June, revealed that the Pentagon and weapons makers overstated the effectiveness of high-technology aircraft, bombs and other systems during the war. Smith (1998).

   Since the truth of these matters was not fully disclosed to the public at the time they in no way affected the American peoples’ view of the war. This shows an effective use of

Censorship.

1.1.3 Censorship Control of Information
The Allied Coalition imposed several conditions on reporters operating in Saudi Arabia. Failure to follow these guidelines would have resulted in expulsion from Saudi Arabia:
  • No mention could be made of the specific numbers of troops, planes, supplies, etc.
  • No mention could be made of future plans.
  • Reporters could not mention the specific locations of units.
  • The rules of engagements, the rules specifying under what conditions Coalition forces would use force, were off limits.
  • Intelligence gathering operations and collection activities could not be mentioned.
  • While an operation was in progress, specific information on friendly troop movements.
  • The points of origin for aircraft flying missions could not be mentioned.
  • Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy military measures.
  • Identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are underway.
  • Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment, or tactics.
  • Operating methods and tactics in general.
  • Operational and support vulnerabilities until the information is released by Central Command.

   The Pentagon accredited all American journalists and required them to observe the following battlefield press rules:
  • No reporters could visit any U.S. military unit or travel outside of Dhahran or Riyadh except in a press pool.
  • No pool was permitted in the field without an escort, usually a U.S. military public-affairs officer (PAO).
  • No interviews of U.S. military personnel were permitted without an escort present.
  • All pool dispatches must first pass through the "military security review system
Violations of the above rules could result in arrest, detention, revocation of press credentials, and expulsion from the combat zone.

   The Pentagon explained that these rules protected American troops, military operations, and the journalists themselves. Not all reporters obeyed these limitations and provided a less censored report front the Gulf but this was only a small faction of the news streaming out of region and not all of it was released even when it was received.

1.2.Propaganda
1.2.1 Hill & Knowlton

   Shortly after the invasion of Kuwait the PR firm Hill & Knowlton was hired and served as mastermind for the Kuwaiti campaign manufacture evidence to alter the public view of the situation in Kuwait. Its activities alone would have constituted the largest foreign-funded campaign ever aimed at manipulating American public opinion. Over the next six months, the Kuwaiti government payed almost $11 million to Hill & Knowlton in the form of fees.

   "Of all the accusations made against the dictator, none had more impact on American public opinion than the one about Iraqi soldiers removing 312 babies from their incubators and leaving them to die on the cold hospital floors of Kuwait City." Macarthur (1992)

   The story of babies torn from their incubators was repeated over and over again. It was recited as fact in Congressional testimony, on TV and radio talk shows, and at the UN Security Council. While the story was a fabrication no evidence disproving it was put forward by the Iraq leaving the public only lies on which to form their views. The silence on the subject would have without doubt convinced many of the validity of the accusation. This gives an example of how too much censorship was in fact detrimental to the Iraqi position because the charges of incubator stealing from Kuwaiti hospitals by the Iraqis would have been easy to squelch had the Iraqi government invited reporters to view conditions in Kuwait.

4. Conclusion

   During any war censorship of some kind is to be accepted and many of the reasons for this are perfectly understandable such as protecting the safety of your troops or deceiving the enemy. Unfortunately also deceived are the public that is also watching. For the most part Americans supported the military's control of the press during the Gulf War. In a Roper public-opinion poll after the Gulf War, 68 percent of those surveyed believed military control of the news was about right, 17 percent wanted more control, and only 13 percent wanted less.

   With such public opinion a view that all censorship and propaganda should be lifted and allow free access can’t reasonably maintained because while the media may want to report everything they cannot make people want to see it. The public viewed the media's job as being done well. The public also believed that the military could have used more censorship than they did.

   The military won extremely positive coverage during the war at the price of an unhappy press corps and doubts about whether what the press saw was the whole story.

References

MACARTHUR, J, R, 1992. Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War.
New York: Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
SMITH, H, 1998. The Media and the Gulf War.
Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press
WILLIAMS, P, 1993. Ground Rules and Guidelines for Desert Storm.
Washington, DC: Praeger
STEWARD, H, D. "A Public Relations Plan for the US Military in the Middle East," Public Relations Quarterly, Winter 1990-91, p. 10.
SIFREY, M, C, 1991 The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions.
New York: Times Books Random House 21-23

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