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Warfare in Europe between fourteenth and sixteenth century

   The early versions of guns were made in two different ways. The first one was a metal one, gun usually made of bronze produced at foundry. This type of gun was a better one as it was made of a solid piece pf metal and therefore was less likely to burst apart on firing. The second method was arranging wrought iron strips into tubes which were then bound together with iron hoops in much the same way as barrels were made. The advantage of these guns was that iron was a much cheaper metal than bronze (but could not be cast), but being made of many pieces faults were more likely to develop, causing either the release of explosive pressure through the sides of the barrel and therefore a reduction in the power of the shot, or even the complete bursting of the gun. This structural weakness was compounded by the inclusion of a detachable breech (such guns were far easier to build) which often detached itself on the discharging of the weapon. Despite their lack of quality, however, iron guns were the more numerous due to their comparative cheapness, although smaller guns tended to be made chiefly from bronze both because of the difficulties of constructing small guns from iron strips, and because they required less metal than the great bombards. The sizes and types multiplied from their modest beginnings until there were guns ranging in size and type from great bombards used for reducing entire cities, to handguns used as anti-personnel weapons.

   The early role played by artillery was in sieges, where its effectiveness was soon widely appreciated. "Broadly speaking, the use of guns meant that sieges could be brought to a conclusion much more quickly." Cannons, with the ability to throw stones with great force over a flatter trajectory and with more accuracy than the old siege engines, could bring an end to a siege in a few weeks where previously it might have taken several months. In 1437, the castle of Castelnau-de-Cernès was "broken down during the said siege by cannon and engines, and a great part of the walls of the same thrown to the ground, so that it was in no way defensible against the king's enemies." On occasion, the mere presence of bombards could be enough to induce swift surrender, cities preferring capitulation to large-scale destruction by cannon fire. As artillery was added to armies in increasing amounts during the 1400s, wars became far more fast-moving affairs. The French employed artillery on a large scale in reducing the English fortresses in Normandy and Gascony, while huge, cumbersome bombards were used to good effect by the Spanish in the Reconquista. Such was the effectiveness of artillery by 1500 that Machiavelli could declare that "No wall exists, however thick, that artillery cannot destroy in a few days."

   The successes which the early guns had in siege warfare led to the bombard being a vital part of any country's armoury. The use of the counterweight trébuchet, which had been in existence in Roman times, failed to decline until the 1380s and was still listed as an active weapon in some French arms inventories until the 1460s. This shows the gradual nature of the introduction of gunpowder artillery (perhaps caused by shortages of materials for the cannons or unwillingness to invest in them when a prince already owned trébuchets), but there was little doubt that guns were becoming by far the better siege weapons. Their importance gave rise to a kind of 'arms race' in France in particular, with cities in the contested areas of the Hundred Years War assigning the acquisition of guns a high priority. Charles the Bold's army included a substantial artillery element in his war with the Swiss (although he was perhaps not a good enough general to make effective use of it), while in 1494, Charles VIII invaded Italy with "...an army of 18,000 men and a horse-drawn siege-train of at least forty guns. Even contemporaries realised that this marked a new departure in warfare: in 1498 the Venetian Senate declared that 'the wars of the present time are influenced more by the force of bombards and artillery than by men at arms'.

   Despite their undoubted worth, however, artillery did have a number of disadvantages at this time. Perhaps the main one of these is the chronic difficulty of moving the heavy guns, especially over land. Philip the Good of Burgundy experienced such problems in his war with Ghent in 1452-3: "Such was the weight of a great bombard which he borrowed from the town of Mons that all the bridges between Mons and Lille had to be strengthened with iron supports for its passage. During the journey, the gun fell into a ditch, and took two days to be extricated by men using lifting equipment specially constructed for the purpose." Transport was easier by river, but clearly this limited the movement of the artillery. It is partly because of these transport problems that artillery (with the exception of handguns) was used little during open field battles. Particularly when manoeuvring was of critical importance to an army, the last thing a commander would want would be to have to wait for the artillery, which would be slower than the rest of his force, and be unlikely to be able to move away from roads. Due to a lack of enthusiasm for such a cumbersome battlefield weapon, field artillery developed little in the early days of gunpowder, and the large cannons which were used on battlefields tended to be immobile siege guns which had been hastily adapted.

   Not only did the lack of mobility of cannons cause problems for armies on the march, but it also restricted their usefulness on the battlefield itself. The absence of effective gun carriages meant that artillery tended to be fixed rather than able to be aimed, the guns being mounted on wooden frames or simply positioned on mounds of earth. Their slow rate of fire (not only because of the time taken to load them, but because it took time for the guns to cool down between shots) and their limited range at this time was another weakness, which led to them being easily overrun. Soldiers could wait at the limit of the guns' range until the first salvo had been fired, then charge, reaching them well before the next shots could be fired, and disable the guns. The weaknesses of artillery on the battlefield were such that, "Even during the second half of the fifteenth century cannons were only used occasionally in pitched battles.

   Handguns were of more use on the battlefield, having none of the transport problems of the heavy artillery and having a great deal in common with the crossbow, a weapon of proven worth. Like the crossbow, the handgun was a specialised anti-personnel weapon, and was ideal for firing at large exposed masses of soldiers where it could inflict considerable damage. The advantages which handguns had over crossbows was their superior hitting power, (of which Pope Pius II remarked, "No armour can withstand the blow of this torment, and even oaks are penetrated by it,") and their relative cheapness due to the simplicity of their construction. As their accuracy improved and the numbers of trained marksmen increased, they came to supersede the crossbows in European armies, but by 1500 this process was by no means complete, the two weapons frequently working side-by-side in battles. While the slow rate of fire of handguns meant they could not stand independently in battle and needed the support of troops armed with close-combat weapons, they became an accepted auxiliary weapon in many armies.

   Despite the increased use of gunpowder weapons in battle, they were by no means always successful. Superiority in artillery was no guarantee of victory, as Charles the Bold discovered at Grandson and Morat in 1476. At Agincourt, the French gunners were pushed to one side by their own men at arms and played no significant role in the course of the battle. There are, however, examples of the successes of guns in battle, hinting at the success they were to achieve in the future. The Battle of Castillon in 1453 showed the devastating effects of crossfire: "Talbot imprudently attacked the [French] camp which led to the intervention of the French battery commanded by Giraud de Samian, a highly respected cannoneer. 'He grievously injured them because with each shot five or six fell dead to the ground'." With the increased use of guns, deaths and injuries caused by them came to be recorded in greater number: "In 1442, John Payntour, an English esquire, was killed by a culverin shot at La Réole. Four years previously, Don Pedro, brother of the king of Castile, had been decapitated by a gunshot during the siege of the castle of Capuana at Naples...In April 1422, one Michael Bouyer, esquire, was languishing in prison at Meaux, 'gravely ill and mutilated in one of his legs by a cannon shot, in such a way that he cannot aid himself'...It was becoming obvious that the gun could not only batter down fortifications, but could kill, and kill selectively from afar."

   It is clear that by 1500, guns had come to be an everyday part of European armies. While the use of firearms on the battlefield tended to be limited to handguns, these were gradually replacing the older bows as the main auxiliary shot weapon. Cannons had made a huge impact on the conduct of siege warfare, bringing sieges to an end comparatively swiftly, and becoming indispensable in great armies. Although there were bound to be initial troubles with what was after all a relatively new weapon, notable successes were being recorded, especially in sieges, and the gun was definitely here to stay. To constitute a revolution, though, the growing use of such weapons would have to have changed not only the methods of making war, but also the outcome and the character of conflicts. What, then, were the consequences of the increased use of gunpowder?

   One of the largest series of changes happened in the area where the new guns were at their most effective, that of siege warfare. The advantages which a defending army could gain by hiding within fortifications had been understood for a long time. During the 'High Middle Ages', the war zones of Western Europe had become studded with castles and forts, and wars came to be characterised not by swift manoeuvre and open field battles, but more through long, drawn-out sieges. The failure of an attacking army to take a castle was likely to cause it a great deal of problems. If bypassed by an army, a defending garrison could retake control of the surrounding countryside from its secure central base and conduct raids on the enemy's army and supplies (especially as fortifications tended to be located at communications centres). Failure to take a large number of castles could result in their garrisons uniting to form an army capable of defeating the enemy force in the open field. In short, territory could not be conquered without gaining control of the fortifications within it.

   The effect of the introduction of effective siege guns with the capability of breaching the walls of castles was to bring the advantage in siege warfare away from defence and more towards the attacking force. With guns able to bring about the capitulation of fortresses within a few weeks or even a few days, there was a diminishing prospect of the defending country being able to organise an army in time to relieve the besieged. It would seem that the introduction of cannons had, for a time at least, called into question the efficacy of defence by small, dispersed garrisons defending fortifications. Had the use of siege guns not produced a defensive reaction, it seems possible that the castle could have been made redundant and defensive armies driven to do battle in the open field on equal terms with their adversaries.

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